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de nuestra historia»: la conmemoración de la 
gran guerra en el antiguo imperio Ruso
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A combination of factors has ensured that commemoration of the First World War in the lands 
of the former Russian Empire has lagged far behind the rest of Europe.  The fact that the 
conflict led directly to the collapse of the tsarist regime and its replacement with a Bolshevik 
state focused attention elsewhere.  The immediate demands of fighting the Civil War and then 
the establishment of the Soviet state provided a strong counter-narrative to the mainstream 
European story of grief, commemoration and loss.  Veterans of the “imperialist war” sat uneasily 
in the new Soviet state during the inter-war years where, under Stalin, even private comme-
moration became difficult.  Despite a partial return to Russian national traditions during the 
“Great Patriotic War” of 1941-1945, this largely ensured that the defeat of Nazism would be the 
defining experience of Russia during the century, legitimising the Soviet state and confirming 
her status as a global power. After 1989/1991 the memory of the Great War re-emerged from 
this shadow, more clearly as the midwife of national independence in the successor states of 
the tsarist empire, and with the return of the Russian state this has continued, perpetuating the 
narrative that her experience was not typical of the rest of Europe.  
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The First World War is often lazily characterised as the “forgotten war” in Russian national 
history and collective memory.1 As Jay Winter noted, Russia had missed out on the “memory 
boom” that had overtaken the rest of Europe in the wake of the conclusion of the conflict and 
“in Russia… the First World War simply vanished as a subject of public discourse, eclipsed 
by the Revolutions of 1917 and the civil war that followed it” (2006, p. 43). The conflict re-
sulted in the collapse of the Russian Empire and the November Revolution. The Bolsheviks, 
who did not aim to lose the territories on the periphery of the Empire, were largely successful 
in restoring some of the non-Russian territories back into the Soviet State. Nevertheless, in 
the Soviet Union commemoration of the Great War was seen to threaten the very integrity of 
the state, as it would allow for a counter-narrative to develop against orthodox state history 
in which non-Russian nationalities could gain independence, as the Poles, Finns and Baltic 
peoples had in the wake of the 1917 revolutions. A further strand of Soviet historiography on 
the conflict in Russia emerged, which argued that the country had less at stake than the west 
European powers, that Russia was only reluctantly dragged into the conflict, and sacrificed 
herself at the behest of her Entente partners.2 The tsar failed to calculate the risks of the war 
for the empire and it became almost a “shameful” episode, not worthy of a great power. As 
late as 1990, the Great Soviet Encyclopedia described the First World War as an “imperialist, 
unjust war”, and this is how the conflict had been portrayed throughout the long history of 
the Soviet Union.3 Subsumed in Bolshevik discourse into the “greater war” of 1914-1921, en-
compassing the revolutions of 1917 and the bloody Civil War, it was consigned as the tragic 
last act of tsarism before the inevitable revolution. The result of this was that for much of 
1 The official website of “Monument to the Heroes of World War I”, run by the Russian Military History Society, not 
only outlines a narrative of the war under the title “A forgotten war”, but also offers short descriptions of Russia’s 
“forgotten victories”. 
2 For a summary of inter-war developments in the Russian historiography of the First World War, see Sumpf (2014). 
3 For more information visit “Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya, ‘Pervaya Mirovaya Voyna 1914-18’”.
Una combinación de factores ha asegurado que la conmemoración de la Primera Guerra Mundial 
en las tierras del anterior imperio ruso se haya quedado atrás con respecto al resto de Europa. El 
hecho de que el conflicto desembocó en el colapso del régimen zarista y su reemplazo por un estado 
bolchevique centró la atención en otro sitio. Las exigencias inmediatas de los enfrentamientos en 
la Guerra Civil y posteriormente el establecimiento del estado soviético ofrecieron un marcado 
contrarrelato frente a la historia principal europea de dolor, conmemoración y pérdida. Los vetera-
nos de la «guerra imperialista» encajaron mal en el nuevo estado Soviético durante los años entre 
guerras donde, bajo Stalin, se hicieron difíciles incluso las conmemoraciones privadas. A pesar del 
regreso parcial a las tradiciones nacionales rusas durante la «Gran Guerra Patriótica» de 1941-
1945, esto aseguró en gran parte que la derrota del nazismo sería la experiencia definitoria de Rusia 
durante el siglo, legitimando el estado Soviético y confirmando su estado como potencia global. 
Tras 1989/1991 la memoria de la Gran Guerra resurgió de esta sombra, más claramente como la 
comadrona de la independencia nacional en los estados sucesores al imperio zarista, y con el regreso 
del estado ruso esto ha continuado, perpetuando la narrativa de que su experiencia no es la típica 
del resto de Europa.
Resumen
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the twentieth century Russia became detached from the powerful grip of remembering and 
memorialising the First World War.4 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union there has been renewed academic and popular interest in the 
conflict that brought to an end to the ancient regime in Russia and ushered in the world’s first 
socialist state.5 If not actually “forgotten”, in recent years the First World War is now returning 
to the centre of Russian official commemorations, through a conscious and selective utilisation 
of the past for political purposes. Vladimir Putin, speaking to the Russian Federal Assembly 
on 4 December 2012, noted that for much of the twentieth-century the First World War was 
“undeservingly forgotten and struck from our historical memory and history for political and 
ideological reasons”.6 There were a number of reasons for the lack of attention paid to the con-
flict in Russian historical scholarship and popular memory. The war itself had of course been 
spectacularly unsuccessful for the Russian Empire, as it appeared to reveal the backwardness 
of the state. In addition, the focal date for Russia during the last century was always 1917 – the 
year of revolutions. Furthermore, in the Soviet Union the First World War was employed purely 
to vindicate the state.7 Collective memory was formed through a highly selective use of the 
Russian past, which was employed to justify the need for a socialist revolution. In many ways 
the absence of any Russian commemoration of remembrance or armistice day for between 1.8 
and 2 million Russian soldiers who were either killed in the conflict, or died of their wounds or 
infectious disease, merely served to reinforce the sense of separation between the new Soviet 
state and the rest of Europe.8
The subsuming and relegating of the conflict into the wider revolutionary crisis continued in the 
post-Second World War period after the all-consuming experience of the “Great Patriotic War” 
of 1941-1945, which took a central place in the acts of official commemoration in the Soviet 
state alongside the October Revolution, and remains central in the Russian collective memory 
of the twentieth century to this day.9 Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s attempt to promulgate a col-
lective memory of the First World War has been one of the most noteworthy examples of the 
political use of history for the purpose of a national identity project in post-communist Eastern 
Europe. The selective use of the past to construct a politically useful narrative has a long his-
tory in Russia and the Soviet Union.10 For much of the last century the conflict was employed 
as a device of geschichtspolitik (politics of history), where a socially-constructed history of the 
4 There is almost no mention of Russia in Winter (1995). 
5 Much of this material is also outward looking. See, for example, the Echoes of the forgotten war webpage.
6 See “Address to the Federal Assembly”. See also Tolz (2014).
7 See Petrone (2011).
8 This is, of course, understandable as Russia’s involvement in the First World War ceased on 3 March 1918 with 
the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In contrast to the First World War, it is estimated that up to five million 
Russians died during the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. For the number of Russian casualties during the 
First World War, see Table 22.1 in Prost (2014, p. 587).
9 Victory Day is still celebrated in Russia and a number of the successor states, such as Ukraine. Unity Day replaced 
official commemoration of the Bolshevik revolution from 2005. See Merridale (2002, p. 100). See also Daucé, 
Désert, Laruelle, Le Huérou & Rousselet (2010). 
10 See, for example, the work undertaken at the Potsdamer Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung on the 
“Erinnerung und Geschichtspolitik in Russland” (memory and politics of history in Russia); Fein (2000); and 
Langenohl (2000). 
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conflict was used “as both the subject and the object of politics.”11 Thus, for ideological reasons, 
it served the purpose of re-inventing the Russian empire in the form of the Soviet Union. 
Instead of continuity, the Bolsheviks had offered an alternative foundation mythology. Their 
leadership had a new historical tradition to memorialise, that of the revolution and the lives of 
Karl Marx, Freidrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin. They chose to ignore the First World War in 
the foundation myth of the Soviet state. This was despite the fact that, as Catherine Merridale 
has noted, the First World War:
shaped the way even the revolutionaries saw their world, colored their view of death, 
brought millions of their future subjects into contact with violence and fear for three 
long years before they came to power and brought it to an end. It claimed not tens, but 
millions of lives… Few stories illustrate the power of social memory more clearly. (Mer-
ridale, 2002, p. 96) 
The construction of this myth was not straightforward as the “social memory” of the First World 
War in Russia, and Eastern Europe more generally, was formed at a time when the fighting was 
continuing – what is generally known as Russia’s “continuum of crisis” between 1914 and 1922, 
where the war, revolution and civil war combined into one wider conflict, the lines between 
which became blurred, especially for those who experienced them. Nikolai Tikhonov (1896-
1979), one of the Soviet poets most associated with the First World War, fought in a hussar 
regiment and then in the Red Army during the Civil War. In his immensely popular collection of 
poetry Orda (The Horde), published in 1922, he often did not distinguish between the separate 
conflicts, but conflated these experiences of war, leaving the reader to locate the context of the 
poems themselves.12 
For the states that succeeded from the tsarist Empire, 1918 served a purpose as the date of 
commemoration, associated as it was with the establishment or re-founding of nation-states, 
which emerged from the ruins of the four defeated multi-national empires. Such was not, 
however, the case for the border-states, above all Ukraine, which were re-incorporated by 
force into the Soviet state.13 The collective memory of the First World War and its immedi-
ate aftermath in Poland and Ukraine has served to reinforce differences with Russia, as well 
as between the two successor states.14 While Soviet Russia had little reason to celebrate the 
short-lived Brest Litovsk system, which collapsed in November 1918, it had allowed for the 
creation of the first nominally independent Ukrainian state, which had subordinated itself to 
the Central Powers on 9 February 1918, through the signing of a protectorate treaty. In this 
period, force rather than diplomacy determined the fate of the Kresy Wschodnie (eastern bor-
derlands) between Poland and the new Soviet state. German and Austrian troops drove the 
Bolsheviks out of Ukrainian territory, and secured limited sovereignty for the fledgling Ukrai-
nian People’s Republic, which in turn was soon replaced at the end of April by the Hetmanate 
11 While both terms are socially constructed, the “politics of memory” does not really fit the Russian case, where 
much of the public discourse on the subject is dominated by the Kremlin, rather than civil society. This ensures 
that public discourse remains to an extent limited. See Heisler (2008a, 2008b). 
12 See, for example, Tikhonov’s 1921 poem “Ogon’, verevka, pulya i topor” (Fire, Rope, Bullet & Axe). In Tikhonov 
(1971, p. 82). 
13 See Balkelis (2014) and Miller (2014). 
14 See Copsey (2013, pp. 92-96). 
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of Pavlo Skoropadskyi when the Central Rada was deposed in a German-sponsored coup.15 
After the demise of the Ober Ost, separate Ukrainian states collapsed in East Galicia after 
Polish forces defeated the West Ukrainian National Republic in early 1919, and in March 
1921 the demise of Symon Petliura’s Ukrainian People’s Republic was confirmed at the Trea-
ty of Riga. It was, therefore, the period 1917-1921, in both the Soviet Union and in the new 
east European nation-states, that became the focus of the development of a new contested 
historical mythology. In states such as the Second Polish Republic, national identity had to 
be forged in highly unfavourable circumstances, as the conflict that enabled the rebirth of 
the Polish state had witnessed Poles fighting for both the Entente and Central Powers. These 
distinct strands of historical memory lay dormant until the collapse of communism between 
1989 and 1991 when they were re-awakened and served as the basis of the “memory wars” 
that took place in Eastern Europe during the Yeltzin and Putin periods. 
Yet the death of so many Russians in the First World War, caused by a conflict that was seen to 
have been imposed unwillingly on Russia, was remembered, albeit in a limited way, by the So-
viet state. The First World War served a duel purpose in the Soviet Union during the inter-war 
years. First, it served as a vehicle for Soviet propaganda, as an imperialist, class-based conflict 
that gave birth to the Soviet Union. The interpretation that the war had emerged as a natural 
offshoot from capitalism – something that Marx and Lenin had long predicted – suited the 
Soviet leadership well, and also served to mask the crucial role played by the German leader-
ship in fomenting revolution in Russia. In addition to this, the war was employed to support the 
claim that the Soviet Union was under a constant imperialist, and then fascist, threat from the 
western capitalist powers. Illustrative of these themes were the large number of works printed 
by the State Publishing House on the war of 1914-1918 during the early inter-war period. For 
example, on 1 August 1924, the tenth anniversary of the German declaration of War on Russia, 
a list of works published on the Great Imperialist War by this publishing house numbered fifty-
eight items, including twenty works of fiction and ten memoirs, with the emphasis overwhelm-
ingly on the suffering of ordinary Russians and the capitalist nature of the conflict.16 
The most high profile way that the war was officially remembered in the Soviet Union during 
the inter-war years was in official publications on the anniversary of the German declaration of 
war, and later, from the mid-1930s, the organisation of officially sanctioned demonstrations in 
memory of the “imperialist” war.17 The nature of these commemorations was strangely imper-
sonal, and very much at odds with the nature of memorialisation in the rest of Europe. In offi-
cial Soviet publications, the experience of individuals and even the details of battles were hardly 
mentioned, with the emphasis firmly on the orthodox Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the 
conflict. Popular discourse was dominated in the mid-1930s by familiar political tropes which 
blamed the traitorous European Social Democrats, especially in Germany, who had fallen into 
line and voted for war credits, leading directly to the “bloodshed, over four years, [of] workers 
and peasants” (“Vo imya chego pogibli milliony”, 1934, p. 2). In this way the Soviet public were 
encouraged to remember the First World War as an increasingly abstract and distant event, 
which came to symbolise not only the specific conflict of 1914 to 1918, but was also employed 
to serve as a reminder of the perilous international situation. In 1938, the anniversary of the 
15 See Chernev (2014). 
16 “Leningradskoye Otdeleniye Gosudarstvennogo Izdatel’stva” (1924, p. 6).
17 See “K Desyatiletiyu imperialistskoy voyny” (1924, p. 3). 
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German declaration of war was used to celebrate “International Anti-War Day”, with the Soviet 
Union the only country taking part. Rather than emphasise the culpability of the moderate left, 
the regime looked to mobilise the Soviet public by warning them of the dangerous international 
situation which was “threatening [them with the] danger of a new world war… now once again 
looming over mankind” as a result of “fascist aggressors [who] again incite world war”, where 
previously “imperialists [had] plunged the peoples of the world into the bloody abyss of war” 
(“Fashizm—eto voyna! Sotsializm—eto mir!”, 1938, p. 1).18 After the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 1941 the character of official representation of the previous conflict changed, 
and the “World Imperialist War” became, down to 1945 at least, “World War I” in the Soviet 
press, emphasising continuity between “Lenin and Stalin on German expansionism” in 1914 
and the invasion of 1941.19 
The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist narratives constructed in the Soviet Union in the pub-
lic sphere during the inter-war period contrasted with the needs of the new nation states of 
Eastern Europe, which required a separate historical narrative to be fused with pre-existing 
national and sub-national histories within the direct context of contested post-imperial spaces 
and state-building. Where, in the Soviet state, the Great War was deemed “illegitimate”, in the 
new successor-states, the conflict legitimised their establishment or rebirth. Memory of the 
First World War, with particular omissions and selection, was widely cultivated, especially at 
state level, the effect of which was to push the smaller East European states more fully into the 
West European sphere, rather than that of the Soviet Union. 
Concurrently, in order to perpetuate the myth that the First World War was imperialist rather 
than defensive in character, the new Soviet state engaged in the publication of pre-war official 
diplomatic documents from the archives of the tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to 
implicate the former regime with culpability for its outbreak. One of the first acts of the new 
Bolshevik regime had been to issue the Decree on Peace on 8 November 1917, one of the provi-
sions of which was the publication of all secret treaties confirmed by the Russian government.20 
The release of these agreements was initially directed against the Provisional Government, but 
they also served a duel purpose, which was to show that Prince Lvov and Kerensky were merely 
continuing the same policies of the old imperial regime.21 Further documents were released to 
counter the tsarist claim that the conflict had been fought in defence of small nations threat-
ened by German and Austro-Hungarian militarism. The result of the selective release of secret 
documents, and the renunciation of tsarist debts, served to ostracise the regime internationally, 
with the result that the Allied and Associated Powers decided that the Russian question was to 
be dealt with militarily, rather than diplomatically, in the peace conferences that followed the 
conclusion of the Great War (Alston, 2006). 
18 In 1939 the emphasis shifted to blame Great Britain for the outbreak of the “Bloody Imperialist War”, see “Dvadtsat’ 
pyat’ let tomu nazad” (1939, p. 5). 
19 See “Lenin i Stalin o germanskom imperializme” (1942, p. 4). 
20 See Zalkind (1921). 
21 Trotsky, the first People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the new Bolshevik government, left the task to his 
Deputy Commissar, Ivan A. Zalkind and N.A. Markin. Together they published seven pamphlets, totalling 130 
documents, between November 1917 and February 1918, in addition to a number of revelations published in 
Pravda between 23 November and 6 December 1917. See Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov iz arkhiva byvshago 
Ministerstva inostrannykh diel (Petrograd: Izd. Narodnago komissarīata po inostrannym dielam, 1917-1918). 
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The initial glut of publications temporarily ceased as a result of the demands of fighting and 
winning the Civil War.22 Publication of further material resumed after the appointment in 1921 
of Mikhail N. Pokrovsky, a Russian Social Democrat and an internationally respected historian, 
as the head of the new Tsentrarkhiv (central archive). Under his leadership, the scattered impe-
rial Foreign Ministry archives were centralised and this allowed for a more systematic release 
of documents from the archives, where, between 1922 and 1941, 106 issues of the journal 
Krasnyi arkhiv were published. The aim for Pokrovsky was “to expose the secrets of imperialist 
policy and diplomacy”, with particular emphasis on the Straits question and the Middle East, 
something which most clearly emphasised the expansionist aims of the tsarist regime and im-
perialist nature of the Great War (Pokrovsky, 1992, p. 1). Weight was also given to the financial 
situation in the period before, and during, the war to reinforce and further justify the Bolshevik 
repudiation of tsarist loans and war debts. 
The publication of Russian as well as German diplomatic documents in the immediate post-
war period provoked a “battle by means of the archival documents” (Pokrovsky quoted in 
Spring, 1996, p. 71), over the character of the Great War, and especially, over the question 
of war guilt.23 The common goals of the Weimar and Soviet regimes had led to the signing 
of the Treaty of Rapallo on 22 April 1922, which prepared the way for economic, military 
and later cultural co-operation between the two revisionist states. Links were soon forged 
between German and Russian historians who had a common goal in revising the “Versailles” 
interpretation of German responsibility. One of the most prominent was Otto Hoetzsch, 
who arranged for the publication of the official Russian collection of Russian documents, 
Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya v Epokhu Imperializma. Dokumentry iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vre-
mennogo pravitel’stv, at the Hartung press in Königsberg.24 This collaboration resulted in the 
simultaneous publication of over 6,000 Russian documents in German translation between 
1931 and 1938, of which only the third series, covering the period 1914 to 1917, was pub-
lished in full before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The collection re-
mained incomplete, as the focus of Soviet historians in the period after 1945 switched firmly 
to the inter-war years and the origins of the Second World War.25 
The change in emphasis of the publication of diplomatic documents reflected wider cultural 
priorities of the Soviet regime. The “Great Patriotic War” became a central element in the devel-
opment of Russian identity, as well as a justification of the revolution itself. After 1956, in line 
with the rather inconsistent policy of de-Stalinisation, Marx, Engels and Lenin, the wider Bol-
shevik leadership during the period of the November Revolution and Civil War, as well as the 
leaders of the European revolutionary tradition, were all incorporated into a distinct narrative 
that further separated Russia from the wider European experience of grief, memorialisation and 
loss. This estrangement was reinforced in the post-1945 period by the lack of physical “sites of 
22 It was to claim the life of one of the editors, Nikolai Grigorevich Markin, in October 1918 in fighting on the Kama 
River. 
23 In addition to the publication of Russian diplomatic documents, Karl Kautsky collected and published German 
documents in 1919 in four volumes. See Kautsky, Montgelas & Schücking (1919). See also Mombauer (2002, pp. 
45-77). 
24 This proved necessary, due to the shortage of paper in the Soviet Union, as the regime prioritised rapid 
industrialisation. The cooperation also included the medical treatment of Pokrovsky in Berlin for bladder cancer. 
See Spring (1996, pp. 75-76). 
25 In the post-war years only very limited publication of tsarist era diplomatic documents took place, mainly 
concerning Russian-Bulgarian relations in the nineteenth century. 
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memory” to the First World War, as much of the fighting had taken place outside of the Soviet 
Union. On Russian soil, only one memorial survived the Stalinist policy of desecration of sites 
of memory, in stark contrast to the war against Nazi Germany.26 
Outside of the Soviet Union, the Russian contribution to the Entente war effort was effectively 
marginalised. The numerous and largely unassimilated Russian émigré communities in France 
and the United States made a point of keeping the memory of the war alive in order to maintain 
a link between themselves and their Russian (pre-revolutionary) identity.27 A positive counter-
narrative of the First World War emerged among the émigré communities, built around the 
cohesion of their officer and veteran organisations, that, according to Aaron J. Cohen (2003), 
enabled a “personal cathartic effect for war veterans in the emigration” (p. 74). In the histories 
produced by the émigrés there was an emphasis placed on the vital role played by Russia in 
the first months of the war, with particular attention placed on the Brusilov offensive of 1916, 
where the Russian forces continued to attack, long after any hope of victory had disappeared, 
at the behest of France.28 The Russian émigré communities also cultivated sites of memory to 
preserve their contribution to the Entente war effort on the western front, where the 44,319 
men of the Russian Ekspedisionnyi korpus vo Frantsii (REF) fought from March 1917 until the 
end of fighting in 1918.29 The memory of the contribution that these troops made to the Allied 
cause was complicated by the fact that when news of the February Revolution broke in April 
1917, a number of the soldiers demanded to be sent back to Russia. After the disastrous failure 
of the Neville Offensive in early May of that year, the 1st and 3rd Brigades participated in the 
wave of mutinies which spread throughout the French army.30 Despite the mixed performance 
of the REF, the Cimitière Militaire Russe de Saint-Hilaire le Grand, located at Mourmelon le 
Grand on the Marne, served as an important émigré site of memory during the Soviet period, 
the cemetery containing the remains of 915 Russian officers and men, around a quarter of the 
total who died on the Western Front.31 
In the last years of the Soviet Union, and in the immediate post-Soviet period, there was a 
move towards normalising the Russian memory of the Great War through the incorporation of 
some émigré myths and interpretations of the conflict into Russian collective memory. Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s policy of “glasnost” and relaxed censorship enabled public debate to take place 
over the Soviet interpretation of Russian history (Petrone, 2015, p. 129). Particular interest 
was paid to the role of the First World War and this continued after the collapse of the Soviet 
26 The monument located in what remained of the Moscow City Fraternal Cemetery was to the memory of Sergei 
Aleksandrovich Shlikhter, a student of Moscow University who died of his wounds on 20 June 1916. See Petrone 
(2011, pp. 1-5). 
27 It is estimated that around 1.5 million Russians fled or were expelled from Russian territory in the years after 1917, 
including over half a million in Germany, some 200,000 in France and around 20,000 in the United States. See 
Hassell (1991, p. 3) and Raeff (1991).
28 See, for example, Danilov (1927), cited in Cohen (2003, p. 76). 
29 See Cockfield (1999).
30 These mutinies culminated in the shelling of the REF camp near La Courtine on 5 September 1917, which 
resulted in the deaths of ten REF men and the wounding of a further forty-four. See Poitevin (1938). In January 
2014 the “Association pour la mémoire de la mutinerie des soldats russes à La Courtine en 1917” was established. 
For more information see “Statuts de l’Association ‘La Courtine 1917’”. 
31 The site was acquired by the French government and in 1937, on the initiative of the Association des officiers 
russes anciens combattants sur le front français, a chapel was built at the site to commemorate the memory of the 
remaining 3,000 Russian casualties of the REF. For more information see Husson (n.d.). Putin, on his state visit 
to France in November 2000, visited the Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois Émigré Russian Cemetery, the burial site of 
numerous White émigrés, rather than the Cimitière Militaire Russe de Saint-Hilaire le Grand. 
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regime. In 1998, in the Moscow suburb of Sokol, the Transfiguration of the Saviour Chapel 
(sometimes called the Primireniia narodov, reconciling the nations) was dedicated on the site 
of the former All-Russian War Cemetery. The cemetery, which included the graves of around 
17,500 war dead, had been systematically destroyed after 1932.32 The dedication of Primire-
niia narodov was an important event in the return of the First World War to Russian memory, 
through a fusion of Orthodox Church symbols with old tsarist and White military traditions. 
On 1 August 2004, marking the ninetieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, an additional, 
and larger, memorial complex was inaugurated at the site, with the opening ceremony attended 
by a number of Kremlin representatives, including Mikhail Fradkov, the Prime Minister, Sergei 
Ivanov, the Minister of Defence, and Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow.33 This site has be-
come the principal focus of the religious memory of the First World War in Russia, and émigré, 
Cossack and White groups, such as the “Dobrovol’cheskiy korpus” (Volunteer Corps), have used 
the anniversary of Armistice Day, 11 November, to hold a march through central Moscow to the 
chapel to commemorate the memory of those who died in the Great War, as well as those who 
fell in the area of the cemetery in November 1917 fighting against the Bolsheviks.34 
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “Great Patriotic War” has continued to be 
an important factor in the development of post-Soviet identity under both the Yeltzin and Putin 
regimes, as well as in the former Soviet republics outside of Russia.35 The re-integration of the 
history of the First World War has been more uneven, but has witnessed the coming together of 
a number of divergent narrative threads, which mirror political and economic developments in 
Russia. In the Yeltzin era the theme of “the new Russia” dominated official rhetoric, and sought 
to contrast contemporary developments with those of the Soviet era. In the decade after 1991, 
attempts were made to look at the First World War as part of a wider conflict, with a particular 
weight given by Russian historians to an inclusion of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 in 
their accounts, seeking to counter what were seen to be dominant Polish narratives about the 
Katyn massacres.36 This emphasis was for the purpose of attempts to “normalise” the excesses 
of Stalinism, through a counter-examination of the plight of Soviet prisoners-of-war, many of 
whom died in Polish captivity.37 By contrasting the victorious popular history firmly established 
around the memory of the “Great Patriotic War”, this project sought to construct a new histori-
cal memory of the First World War, which emphasised Russia’s victimhood, seeking to balance 
out the wider twentieth-century narrative of Russia under Stalin as perpetrator of crimes (Tolz, 
2014, pp. 261-275). Memorialisation of these events tended to be complicated by a reluctance 
of the state under Yeltzin to fully embrace the memory of the First World War, and the fact that 
the sites of memory linked to the Polish-Soviet War were not located on Russian territory. 
32 The marginal importance of the Great War during the Yeltzin period meant that the site only narrowly avoided 
being turned into a shopping centre in 1997. 
33 For more information visit “Zapozdaloye pokayaniye”. 
34 For more information visit “Panikhida po pogibshim uchastnikam Pervoy mirovoy proydet v Moskve” (2014). 
35 Victory Day is still celebrated in Ukraine on the anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. See Hösler 
(2009). 
36 It was seen to be useful to characterise right-wing interpretations as mainstream views on the Katyn massacres. See 
Nowak (2013). 
37 This narrative was continued with the inauguration, in 2005, of the “Day of National Unity”, which commemorated 
the 1612 liberation of Moscow from Polish-Lithuanian rule, and also falls on the feast day of the Russian Orthodox 
icon of Our Lady of Kazan. The day replaced both the Soviet celebration of the October Revolution as well as the 
Day of Accord and Conciliation. 
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This trope has subsequently been replaced with a more recent narrative which relegates the 
Soviet period to within what Putin has called the “integrity of the thousand-year long history of 
our country”, emphasising continuity in the Russian past.38 This trend has led to the develop-
ment of a new methodology in the teaching of history by the Council of the Russian History 
Society, directly incorporating these politically-led themes into Russian schools. Central to this 
transformation is the place of the First World War, which looks to place “Russia… [at] the epi-
center of the ‘great upheaval’ [of] 1914-1921”.39 With the approach of the centenary of the First 
World War, the narrative still seems unable to emerge from the shadow of the wider political 
concerns of the state. In the meantime, historians in Russia and in the West are beginning to 
devote more attention to the study of the conflict on the Eastern front with, for example, the 
establishment of a major international research project, “Russia’s Great War”.40 This project 
has been initiated with the aim of putting Russia’s experience into international context and 
investigating her “continuum of crisis” as a special period of Russian history, rescuing the war 
from being an “historical afterthought”.41 The interest has not only been academic, with many 
leading figures in and around the Russian establishment making political capital out of return-
ing the war to what they see as its rightful place in the national historical narrative as well as 
a wider collective memory, claiming that it “occupies a special place in Russian and world his-
tory” (SRio, Kontseptsiya novogo uchebno-metodicheskogo kompleksa, p. 46).42 Under Putin, the 
return of Russia as a great power has led to an emphasis on imperial grandeur, beyond that of 
the “Soviet Empire”, and has included the development of a religious character by including the 
Orthodox Church in the memorial process. 
The return of stories of individual heroism by ordinary Russians in the conflict has been more 
successfully incorporated into the new Russian narrative of the Great War.43 In recent years, 
these threads have been enthusiastically picked up again by the regime, where President Vladi-
mir Putin used them prominently in the centennial commemorations of the German declara-
tion of war on Russia to unveil a monument to the “heroes” of the First World War at park 
Pobedy (Victory Park), the central site of Russian military memory located above Moscow at 
Poklonnaya Gora. The fact that the First World War has been integrated into a site dedicated 
to the glorious, and victorious, Russian past is noteworthy as the space makes reference to the 
Great Patriotic War as well as the 1812 campaign against Napoleon. The process of choosing 
the design of the memorial, which despite being supported in the main by the government was 
also paid for by public subscriptions, was opened up to the public in a popular vote in the sum-
mer of 2013.44 The winning design, by Andrei Koval’chuk, the People’s Artist of the Russian 
Federation, aimed to reinforce the view that the conflict should take its place within the long 
38 Full Vladimir Putin’s intervention can be accessed at “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly” (2014). 
39 See “Soveta Rossiyskogo istoricheskogo obshchestva” (2013, p. 46). 
40 For a recent western account that seeks to view the Great War as part of a wider crisis, see Holquist (2002). 
41 For more information see “Russia’s Great War & Revolution”. In Russia, the Russian Historical and Russian 
Military History societies were reconstituted in 2012. 
42 See also “Rabota nad Kontseptsiyey novogo uchebno-metodicheskogo kompleksa po otechestvennoy istorii 
zavershena” (2013).
43 See, for example, the “Family archives” page on the official website of the Monument to the Heroes of World War I. 
44 It has been suggested that the popular vote was subject to rigging, with the “winning” design receiving only the 
third highest number of votes in the public poll, and the two most popular not being included in the second 
round of voting, in which the winner also received fewer votes than two other designs. Fore more information visit 
“Monument to the Heroes of World War I”. See Petrone (2015, p. 142). 
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continuity of Russian national history, symbolised by a large Russian flag with military figures 
in a battle scene and soldiers departing for the front, being blessed by an Orthodox priest. The 
similarity between this symbolism and the predominant narratives of early émigré interpreta-
tion of the war is marked.45 
The melding of the politically useful aspects of the émigré interpretation with some aspects 
of the Soviet – namely the use of 1 August as the focal point of Russian commemoration of 
the First World War – allows for a cohesive narrative of Russian victimhood at the hands of 
German aggression. The official centenary celebrations in Russia have been characterised by 
a special emphasis on this date, which in December 2012 was designated “Day of Memory 
of the Russian Soldiers who Died in WWI”, one of Russia’s “Days of Military Glory”, and first 
marked in 2013.46 This was but one aspect of the official move to mark the centennial com-
memoration of the war. On 1 August 2014, at the unveiling of the monument at Poklonnaya 
Gora, President Putin spoke of “restoring the historical truth about the First World War… 
we are re-establishing today the unbroken continuity of our history [through] incorporating 
the First World War’s ‘sacred memory’” and also a desire to “restore the historical truth… 
that victory was stolen from the country” (“Unveiling of a monument to world war I heroes”, 
2014). In reincorporating the memory of the First World War, the Russian President contin-
ued his government’s policy of reinterpreting Russian history in an attempt to bolster support 
for his regime, while distancing Russia from its Soviet past, suggesting that Russia only suf-
fered defeat in the Great War due to being stabbed-in-the-back by the Bolsheviks, who had 
“betray[ed] the national interests” (“Unveiling of a monument to World War I heroes”, 2014). 
In July 2013, speaking at the Seliger Forum youth camp, Putin linked the downfall of the 
tsarist regime directly to the actions of the Bolsheviks, who
wanted the defeat of [their] own country in the First World War… I must say that they 
made a [vital] contribution to the defeat of Russia. And it was an amazing situation in 
which Germany itself surrendered to the Entente countries, and Russia lost [to] the los-
ing country, Germany, and with grave consequences – the loss of large areas. (“Vstrecha s 
uchastnikami foruma ‘Seliger-2012’”, 2012) 
Putin further emphasised the Panslavist nature of the conflict through mention of the de-
fence of the “brotherly Slavic people” of Serbia, and in this way the commemoration of the 
Great War has been employed as another element in the regime’s attempt to forge a more as-
sertive foreign policy in eastern Europe, looking to link-up with émigré groups and members 
of the Russian diaspora, especially in the Baltic States and Ukraine (“Vstrecha s uchastnika-
mi foruma ‘Seliger-2012’”, 2012). The Orthodox Church has enthusiastically fallen in behind 
the Kremlin line. Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev, Patriarch Kirill I of Moscow, spoke at a 
ceremony at Transfiguration of the Saviour Chapel on 1 August 2014, to mark the centenary 
of the outbreak of the war, where he outlined his interpretation of events. Rather than being 
an “imperialist” war, 
[i]t was a struggle for our homeland, for its independence, its sovereignty. It was a struggle 
for the salvation of the brotherly Serbian people – for the preservation of Orthodoxy. And 
45 See, for example, the memoirs of a Baron Taube, a former senior official at Choristers’ Bridge. Taube (1928). An 
attempt is also being made to rehabilitate White generals to a similar status to that which General Alexii Brusilov 
almost alone enjoyed during the Soviet period. See, for example, “Geroi Pervoy mirovoy voyny”.
46 For more information see “Vneseny izmeneniya v zakon o dnyakh voinskoy slavy i pamyatnykh datakh” (2012).
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it is not the fault of those who gave their lives that Russia did not achieve victory… 
During the war, there was a revolution, and then a betrayal of power, almost the whole 
of Ukraine, a significant part of Russia, [was] given to the enemy, who in turn suffered 
a complete defeat. (“Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Kirill sovershil litiyu o upokoyenii geroyev 
Pervoy mirovoy voyny”, 2014)  
This interpretation, emphasising as it does the territories of the tsarist empire that were lost 
in the wake of the First World War, makes oblique reference to the fact that no official Rus-
sian representatives were allowed to argue the case of Russian territorial expansion at the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919, ensuring that she lost out on what are seen to be legitimate territo-
rial gains, such as the Austro-Hungarian province of East Galicia. During the early stages of the 
war, the tsarist regime did little to hide its irredentist war aims; in August 1914, General Aleksei 
Brusilov, then in command of the Russian Eighth Army, stated that “we are entering Galicia, 
which, despite its being a constituent part of Austria-Hungary, is a Russian land from time im-
memorial, populated, after all, by the same Russian people” (Lemke, 2003, p. 199).47 Beyond 
her borders, in the Putin era Russia has employed “soft power” through the use of political 
discourse in order to influence the internal politics of those states which have a significant 
Russian ethnic minority. 
In contrast to other states that employ soft power, Russia’s “is strongly associated with dis-
courses of a shared past and with the common values, culture and history that arise from it” 
(Bogomolov & Lytvynenko, 2012, p. 3). Since late 2012 the regime has employed the history of 
the First World War in order to link back to a common “Russian past”. Members of the Russian 
diaspora have been active in this process. On 24 August 2014, Vladimir Medinsky, Minister 
of Culture of the Russian Federation since May 2012 and Chairman of the Russian Military 
Historical Society, unveiled a monument in Kaliningrad paid for by private subscriptions.48 The 
monument looks to emphasise the common nature of the struggle against Germany, by repre-
senting the three social classes of the imperial Russian army: noble officers, peasants and the 
other classes (raznočinec). Kaliningrad is the only part of the Russian Federation that contains 
a significant number of burial sites from the First World War. K.A. Pahalyuk estimated in 2011 
that there were some sixty-six monuments and seventy mass graves in the Kalinigrad region that 
had survived the destruction and dislocation of the Second World War and post-war period.49 
Further memorials are being erected: GS Group, a private holding company with links to the 
Putin regime, has funded and constructed a First World War memorial park in Gusev (previ-
ously Gumbinnen) outside Kaliningrad, the site of the Russian victory over the Germans at the 
Battle of Gumbinnen on 20 August 1914.50 In addition, a further seven memorials dedicated 
to the “heroes of World War I” are under construction in Russia as well as the planned opening 
47 See also, for example, the “Proclamation to the Poles”, issued by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the Russian 
commander-in-chief, on 14 August 1914, in Horak (1964, pp. 212-213). 
48 For more information see “Kaliningrad begins World War I Centennial Commemoration”, 2014). 
49 Down to 1939 it was estimated that 32,540 Russian soldiers were buried on the territory of East Prussia in some 
2,200 individual and mass burial sites, see Pakhalyuk (2011). 
50 See “A monument to victims of World War I by Mikhail Shemyakin unveiled in the Kaliningrad region” (2014). 
In addition to this monument, the Russian Society of Military History organised a re-creation of the Battle of 
Gumbinnen. 
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of a museum of the First World War at the Martial Chambre in Tsarskoe Selo.51 The Russian 
Federal programme for the centennial commemoration includes the construction of Orthodox 
memorial sites outside of the Russian Federation, in Bolzano in northern Italy, and in Belgrade, 
as well as in Ukraine and Byelorussia. Attempts to establish memorial sites in Ukraine have 
stalled in light of recent political developments.52 
The narrative of the Great War is therefore of particular use to the Kremlin in the current 
political climate, and it has been employed to emphasise a common, shared, imperial Russian 
past. At the present time in Russia, there is no generally accepted collective memory of the 
First World War and open discussion of the subject is stunted by the dominance of official 
state media.53 What has happened in Russia today is that there has been a replacement of one 
officially-sanctioned interpretation of the First World War with another. Whilst the similarities 
between the old émigré interpretation and that currently favoured by the Kremlin may well be 
striking, the latter serves a fundamentally different purpose. Russian émigré interpretations of 
the war were employed to “normalise” the Russian experience during the First World War, and 
commemorations and sites of memory were employed to ensure that Russia would keep her 
place within the Entente (if not the European) experience. Today, official Russian interpreta-
tions are having the opposite effect, reinforcing the distinct and separate nature of the Russian 
experience by emphasising the national character of her involvement, at a time when scholar-
ship of the war is increasingly looking to place the conflict in transnational and international 
perspective. The process of looking beyond what Putin characterised as the “simple truth” that 
Russian history did not begin in either 1917 or 1991, but “rather, that we have a common, con-
tinuous history spanning over one thousand years”, and the reincorporation of the First World 
into this narrative is, at least at the moment, a vital link back to the Russian imperial past (“Ad-
dress to the Federal Assembly”, 2012). The dual aim of this policy is undoubtedly an attempt 
to foster patriotism within Russia, while maintaining Russia’s status as a European power. This 
reinterpretation of the conflict is unlikely to remain unchallenged, as the negative perception 
of the First World War from the Soviet era is still pervasive in Russia today. It is likely that, in 
the current international climate, further attempts will be made by the regime to replace old 
“imperialist” narratives of the conflict with those that emphasise the defensive and wider geo-
political interests of the old tsarist regime. Whether the public and political interest sparked 
by the centennial will continue it is difficult to say, but it is undoubtedly the case that the First 
World War is no longer “forgotten” in Russian collective memory, and it is the Russian state that 
is taking the lead in this process. 
51 The first memorial was dedicated in Lipetsk on 5 August 2014. The other memorials are located in Tula, Smolensk, 
Noginsk, Omsk, Stavropol and Saransk. 
52 See Lisitsyn (2014). 
53 See Fein (2009).
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